Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorLevati, M. Vittoriaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:13Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902-
dc.description.abstractBidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,073en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfair division gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleDoes procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638482151en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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