Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2010,073
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.
Schlagwörter: 
auctions
fair division games
procedural fairness
JEL: 
D44
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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