Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2010,073
Abstract: 
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.
Subjects: 
auctions
fair division games
procedural fairness
JEL: 
D44
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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