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dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.contributor.authorSchacht, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:56Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:56Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56892-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the inuence of induced group identity on the determination of prices and beliefs in a small market game. We create group identity through a focal point coordination game. Subjects play a three-person bargaining game where one seller can sell an indivisible good to one of two competing buyers under four different treatments varying the buyer-seller constellation. We find evidence of in group favoritism on the buyer side. However we do not detect a lower ask prices for in-group sellers for in-group buyers, indicating that in-group favoritism is in favor of the more powerful market participan.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2011,043en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup identityen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Rolleen_US
dc.titleGroup identity and discrimination in small markets: Asymmetry of in-group favorsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn669601748en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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