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dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:48Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56887-
dc.description.abstractWe construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly less kind than in the simultaneous move treatment as well as the leader trustees. These findings can not be explained by models of inequity aversion, pure guilt aversion, or conformity. Instead, follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that serves them best. When the leader trustee played unkind, they tend to conform and play unkind, too. When the leader made a kind choice, followers seem to perceive the duty of reciprocating to the trustor as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when there is someone to shift responsibility to, like the leader in our three person game.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2011,029en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordteam productionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrusten_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal agenten_US
dc.subject.keywordguilten_US
dc.subject.keywordguilt alleviationen_US
dc.subject.keywordconformityen_US
dc.subject.keywordfalse consensus effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordlab experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcherry pickingen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleMotivational cherry pickingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664329160en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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