Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56883 
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dc.contributor.authorVollstädt, Ulrikeen
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56883-
dc.description.abstractBargaining is prevalent in economic interactions. Under complete information, game theory predicts efficient bargaining outcomes (immediate acceptance of first offer) (see Rubinstein, 1982). However, continuous rejections of offers leading to inefficient delays (escalation) have regularly been found in previous bargaining experiments even under complete information (see Roth, 1995). I test experimentally (1) whether power asymmetry leads to more escalation in bargaining and (2) whether perspective-taking reduces escalation. I find that power asymmetry increases escalation, but that perspective-taking does not reduce escalation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,054en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD89en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtwo-person bargaining experimenten
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric poweren
dc.subject.keywordescalationen
dc.subject.keywordperspective-takingen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwMachten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titlePower asymmetry and escalation in bargaining-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn672476266en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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