EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56883
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorVollstädt, Ulrikeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56883-
dc.description.abstractBargaining is prevalent in economic interactions. Under complete information, game theory predicts efficient bargaining outcomes (immediate acceptance of first offer) (see Rubinstein, 1982). However, continuous rejections of offers leading to inefficient delays (escalation) have regularly been found in previous bargaining experiments even under complete information (see Roth, 1995). I test experimentally (1) whether power asymmetry leads to more escalation in bargaining and (2) whether perspective-taking reduces escalation. I find that power asymmetry increases escalation, but that perspective-taking does not reduce escalation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2011,054en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD89en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-person bargaining experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordescalationen_US
dc.subject.keywordperspective-takingen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMachten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titlePower asymmetry and escalation in bargainingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn672476266en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
672476266.pdf394.34 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.