Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56872
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dc.contributor.authorLeibbrandt, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorRamalingam, Abhijiten_US
dc.contributor.authorSääksvuori, Laurien_US
dc.contributor.authorWalker, James M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:24Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:24Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56872-
dc.description.abstractAbundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2012,004en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafeen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleBroken punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685082571en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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