Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56861 
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dc.contributor.authorSuzuki, Toruen
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:29:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:29:57Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56861-
dc.description.abstractIn the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2012,014en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelL15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsignaling gameen
dc.subject.keywordconsideration seten
dc.subject.keywordcounter signalingen
dc.subject.keywordlimited attentionen
dc.subject.keywordmarketingen
dc.subject.keywordadvertisingen
dc.titlePersuasive silence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn689680295en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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