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Title:Learning in networks: An experimental study using stationary concepts PDF Logo
Authors:Berninghaus, Siegfried
Neumann, Thomas
Vogt, Bodo
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2011,048
Abstract:Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a attice and a circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in random matching.
Subjects:experimental economics
networks
learning
JEL:C70
C73
C91
D83
D85
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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