|
EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56854
|
| | |
| Title: | | Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach  |
| Authors: | | Güth, Werner |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2011,020 |
| Abstract: | | Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the procedurally fair ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates. |
| Subjects: | | social ranking fairness fair game forms objective equality mechanism design committee decision making |
| JEL: | | C70 C72 D63 D71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56854
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|