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dc.contributor.authorAvrahami, Judithen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorHertwig, Ralphen_US
dc.contributor.authorKareev, Yaakoven_US
dc.contributor.authorOtsubo, Hironorien_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:29:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:29:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56853-
dc.description.abstractWhether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token, if proposers learn fast that low offers are doomed to be rejected and adjust their offers accordingly, pressure would be lifted from responders to learn to accept such offers. Play would converge toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret - both material and strategic - which determines how players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment does and another does not provide population feedback in addition to informing players about their own outcome. Our results show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when players make repeated decisions in the ultimatum game with randomly changing opponents, and when they learn not only about their own outcome in the previous round but also find out how the population on average has adapted to previous results (path dependence).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,092en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargaining gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordregreten_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwUltimatumspielen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwReputationen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleLearning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavioren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn642324085en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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