Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56851
Authors: 
Gamba, Astrid
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,032
Abstract: 
A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some Bayesian Nash equilibrium is played. We show that under unobservability of preference types, conditional on selecting some self-confirming equilibrium as a rule for mapping preference into behavior, non-selfish preferences may be evolutionarily successful.
Subjects: 
evolution of preferences
altruism
learning
self-confirming equilibrium
JEL: 
A13
C72
D64
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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