|
EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56851
|
| | |
| Title: | | On the evolution of preferences  |
| Authors: | | Gamba, Astrid |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2011,032 |
| Abstract: | | A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some Bayesian Nash equilibrium is played. We show that under unobservability of preference types, conditional on selecting some self-confirming equilibrium as a rule for mapping preference into behavior, non-selfish preferences may be evolutionarily successful. |
| Subjects: | | evolution of preferences altruism learning self-confirming equilibrium |
| JEL: | | A13 C72 D64 D83 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56851
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|