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dc.contributor.authorUhl, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:29:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:29:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56847-
dc.description.abstractWeak paternalism commits protégés to their own plans. This experiment addresses the question of whether protégés judge weakly paternalistic acts primarily by means of their consequences or on principle grounds. Subjects receive a reward for showing up to the laboratory early the next morning which decreases in time. Protégés can either self-commit to a planned time or self-liberate by preserving spontaneity. By making this binary choice protégés express their preference regarding liberty. Simultaneously, another subject is either paternalistic or liberal by making an analogous choice for them. We analyze protégés' attitudes toward both policy styles via costly reward choices. If only consequences matter, self-committers should appreciate paternalism while self-liberators should condemn it. A deontological aversion against paternalism would negate a difference between both groups. Differing judgments constitute a consequentialist pattern. However, this pattern is driven by self-liberators' clear judgments. For self-committers also a norm of non-interference into others' liberty can be identified.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,055en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelI31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordself-commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordweak paternalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordfreedom of choiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordagencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral judgmentsen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstverpflichtungen_US
dc.subject.stwPersönlichkeitspsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleDo self-committers mind commitment by others? An experiment on weak paternalismen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638353580en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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