|
EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56843
|
| | |
| Title: | | Procedurally fair provision of public projects: An axiomatic characterization  |
| Authors: | | Güth, Werner Kliemt, Hartmut |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2011,016 |
| Abstract: | | Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity. |
| Subjects: | | unanimity in collective decision making Buchanan Wicksell |
| JEL: | | H4 H61 D62 D63 D71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56843
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|