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Title:Procedurally fair provision of public projects: An axiomatic characterization PDF Logo
Authors:Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2011,016
Abstract:Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
Subjects:unanimity in collective decision making
Buchanan
Wicksell
JEL:H4
H61
D62
D63
D71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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