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dc.contributor.authorZiegelmeyer, Anthonyen
dc.contributor.authorMarch, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorKrügel, Sebastianen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-24-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:28:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:28:37Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56839-
dc.description.abstractWeizsäcker (2010) estimates the payoff of actions to test rational expectations and to measure the success of social learning in information cascade experiments. He concludes that participants perform poorly when learning from others and that rational expectations are violated. We show that his estimated payoffs rely on estimates of the publicly known prior and signal qualities which may lead the formulated test of rational expectations to generate false positives. We rely on the true values of the prior and signal qualities to estimate the payoff of actions. We confirm that the rational expectations hypothesis is rejected, but we measure a much larger success of social learning.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2012,006en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformation cascadesen
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordquantal response equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwHerdenverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwRationale Erwartungen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.title"Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations": Comment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn687471303en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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