Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56837
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dc.contributor.authorKellner, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56837-
dc.description.abstractWe test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal-agent problem with multiple agents. When output distributions are uncertain, models of ambiguity aversion suggest that tournaments may become more attractive than independent wage contracts, in contrast to the case where output distributions are known. We do so by presenting agents with a choice between tournaments and independent contracts, which are designed in a way that under uncertainty about output distribution (that is, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer tournaments, while ambiguity neutral agents prefer independent contracts, independent of their degree of risk aversion. This is the case, because the tournament removes all ambiguity about the equilibrium wages. We compare the share of participants who choose the tournament under ambiguity with the share of participants choosing the tournament in a control treatment, where output distributions are know. As the theory predicts, we find indeed that under ambiguity the share of agents who choose the tournaments is higher than in the case of known output distributions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2011,033en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelM55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordambiguity aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEllsberg urnen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleAmbiguity aversion as a reason to choose tournamentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664331157en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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