Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56824
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,034
Abstract: 
We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair provision point mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public projects should be implemented. We also run control treatments where only one of the two projects can be implemented. We find that (a) mixed feelings per se do not affect bidding behavior, and (b) the provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines significantly when it faces competition from the public good.
Subjects: 
public project
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
JEL: 
C72
C92
D63
H44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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