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dc.contributor.authorAngelova, Veraen_US
dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:26:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:26:58Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56823-
dc.description.abstractThe market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice. We experimentally investigate whether voluntary contract components can reduce the conflict of interest and increase truth telling of advisors. We compare a voluntary payment upfront, an obligatory payment upfront, a voluntary bonus afterwards, and a three-stage design with a voluntary payment upfront and a bonus after. Across treatments, there is significantly more truthful advice when both clients and advisors have opportunities to reciprocate. Within treatments, the frequency of truthful advice is significantly higher when the voluntary payment is large.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2012,011en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG20en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial advisorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsender-receiver gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary paymenten_US
dc.subject.stwAnlageberatungen_US
dc.subject.stwHonoraren_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalanlageen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleDo voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn689524307en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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