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dc.contributor.authorHugh-Jones, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorLeroch, Martin A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:26:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:26:52Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56820-
dc.description.abstractPeople exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from different groups. Subjects then allocated money between themselves and others, learning the group of the others. Subjects who knew that their partner in the Prisoner's Dilemma had defected became relatively less generous to people from the partner's group, compared to a third group. We use our experiment to develop hypotheses about group reciprocity and its correlates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,066en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordgroupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleGroup reciprocityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638375924en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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