EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56819
  
Title:Does entitlement crowd out efficiency or equality seeking? Selling the roles in generosity game experiments PDF Logo
Authors:Bäker, Agnes
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2010,091
Abstract:In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity game, participants are asked to buy their role via a random price mechanism. This should entitle them to exploit the chances which their role provides and at the same time avoid the selection bias of competitive auctions. We find that entitlement crowds out equality seeking and strengthens efficiency seeking. Interpreting participants' willingness to pay as an aspiration level of how much they want to earn, our design further allows us to test for satisficing behavior. Indeed, we find evidence for satisficing behavior in the data.
Subjects:entitlement
generosity
game
efficiency seeking
inequity aversion
satisficing
JEL:C7
C91
D03
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
642190399.pdf987.23 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56819

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.