|
EconStor >
Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56692
|
| | |
| Title: | | Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation  |
| Authors: | | Fehr, Dietmar Schmid, Julia |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2011-009 |
| Abstract: | | Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining contestants, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest contestants considerably overexert. A possible explanation is that these contestants are afraid they will regret a low but risky bid if they lose and thus prefer a strategy which gives them a low but secure pay-off. |
| Subjects: | | experiments contests all-pay auction heterogeneity regret aversion |
| JEL: | | C72 C92 D84 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56692
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|