Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56642
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dc.contributor.authorFiocco, Raffaeleen_US
dc.contributor.authorGilli, Marioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-05T16:12:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-05T16:12:41Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56642-
dc.description.abstractWithin a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the gains of collusion with the firm. The novelty of this paper is that both the regulatory mechanism and the side contracting between the agency and the firm are modelled as a bargaining process. While as usual the inefficient firm does not have any interest in cost manipulation, we find that the efficient firm has an incentive to collude only if the agency's bargaining power is high enough, and the total gains of collusion are now lower than those the two partners would appropriate if the agency could make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Then, we focus on the optimal institutional responses to the possibility of collusion. In our setting, where the incompleteness of contracts prevents the principal from designing of a screening mechanism and thus Tirole's equivalence principle does not apply, we show how the players' bargaining powers crucially drive the optimal response to collusion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper |x2011-047en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBargaining and collusion in a regulatory modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn667294783en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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