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dc.contributor.authorFiocco, Raffaeleen_US
dc.contributor.authorScarpa, Carloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-05T16:12:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-05T16:12:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56634-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentralized agencies - each regulating a single market - charge lower prices than a unique regulator, making consumers better off. However, this leads to excessive costs for the taxpayers who subsidize the firms, so that centralized regulation is preferable. Under asymmetric information about the firms' costs, lobbying induces a unique regulator to be more concerned with the industry's interests, and this decreases social welfare. When the substitutability between the goods is high enough, the firms' lobbying activity may be so strong that decentralizing the regulatory structure may be social welfare enhancing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSFB 649, Economic Risk Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSFB 649 discussion paper 2011-046en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordenergy marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwEnergiemarkten_US
dc.subject.stwProduktsubstitutionen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe regulation of interdependent marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn667237372en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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