Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56577 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 31-2011
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professionals and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank's announcement. We explore differences between shadow and actual committee decisions based on an adapted Taylor role and report a few systematic differences especially in the case of euro area shadow committee when the data are disaggregated according to the background of the shadow members, and when the member's country of origin is considered.
Schlagwörter: 
monetary policy committees
Taylor rules
central bank communication
JEL: 
E52
E58
E61
E69
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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