Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56577
Authors: 
Neuenkirch, Matthias
Siklos, Pierre L.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Joint discussion paper series in economics 31-2011
Abstract: 
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professionals and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank's announcement. We explore differences between shadow and actual committee decisions based on an adapted Taylor role and report a few systematic differences especially in the case of euro area shadow committee when the data are disaggregated according to the background of the shadow members, and when the member's country of origin is considered.
Subjects: 
monetary policy committees
Taylor rules
central bank communication
JEL: 
E52
E58
E61
E69
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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