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dc.contributor.authorElbialy, Noraen_US
dc.contributor.authorGouda, Moamenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:56:06Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:56:06Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56572-
dc.description.abstractThe existence of formal IPR laws can be considered a prerequisite for having efficient law enforcement but does not imply efficient enforcement in itself. A simple model is constructed to explain the interplay between the IPR law and human behavior within counterfeiting countries. It shows how a politically monitored IPR enforcement strategy is able to alter formal IPR laws or institutions but might not affect informal institutions, or human morals and behavior, to the same extent, hence barely affecting piracy situation. The model shows the essential role of informal institutions and its sanction mechanisms in the enforcement process. The main obstacle of IPR enforcement is that people are still not convinced that IPR violations are unethical. Religion can be considered an informal institution that might support or hinder formal laws issued with regards to IPR and hence influence de facto enforcement of laws, especially in countries with high piracy rate if a high adherence to religion is found. As the Religion-Loyalty Index (RLI) developed by this study shows, Muslim countries have the highest religiosity level among different religions. Consequently, an investigation of how Islamic jurisprudence views IPR piracy is conducted. As Islam generally prohibits IPR piracy, a set of policy recommendations based on new institutional perspective is presented that can effectively help in minimizing IPR piracy in developing countries in general and Muslim ones in specific.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 20-2011en_US
dc.subject.jelF19en_US
dc.subject.jelK39en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL86en_US
dc.subject.jelZ12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIntellectual Property Rights (IPR)en_US
dc.subject.keywordformal vs. informal institutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNew Institutional Economics (NIE)en_US
dc.subject.keywordsoftware piracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordreligionen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.stwImmaterialgüterrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwReligionen_US
dc.subject.stwIslamen_US
dc.subject.stwSoftwareen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktpiraterieen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.subject.stwIslamische Staatenen_US
dc.titleEnforcing IPR through informal institutions: The possible role of religion in fighting software piracyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657908711en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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