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Title:Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds PDF Logo
Authors:Grigoryan, Artur
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Joint discussion paper series in economics 17-2011
Abstract:The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place.
Subjects:Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)
transparency
policy delegation
external management
JEL:D7
E6
F3
G2
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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