EconStor >
Philipps-Universität Marburg >
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg >
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56566
  
Title:Empirical methods in the analysis of collusion PDF Logo
Authors:Paha, Johannes
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Joint discussion paper series in economics 33-2010
Abstract:Regression methods are commonly used in competition lawsuits for, e.g., determining overcharges in pricefixing cases. Technical evaluations of these methods' pros and cons are not necessarily intuitive. Appraisals that are based on case studies are descriptive but need not be universally valid. This paper opens up the black box called econometrics for competition cases. This is done by complementing theoretical arguments with estimation results. These results are obtained for data that is generated by a simulation-model of a collusive industry. Using such data leaves little room for debate about the quality of these methods because estimates of, e.g., overcharges can be compared to their true underlying values. This analysis provides arguments for demonstrating that thoroughly conducted econometric analyses yield better results than simple techniques such as before-and-after comparisons.
Subjects:collusion
empirical methods
industry simulation
JEL:C51
D43
K21
L41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
642180296.pdf910.75 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56566

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.