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dc.contributor.authorAlbert, Maxen_US
dc.contributor.authorHildenbrand, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:55:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:55:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56556-
dc.description.abstractTheories of industrial organization (IO) are tested in the laboratory more and more often. The example we consider throughout the paper is oligopoly theory, specifically, the Cournot and the Stackelberg model of duopolistic quantity competition with homogeneous products. These models have often been subjected to tests: participants were told that they represented firms and received profits according to their chosen quantities. However, testing a theory in the laboratory requires that the experimental design falls into the domain of the theory. The domain of mainstream IO is market behaviour of large (i.e., multi-agent) firms. The basic hypothesis is that these firms maximize profits. This hypothesis cannot be tested in experiments where single agents are told that they represent firms. For a test, it would be necessary to assume that multi-agent groups and single agents show the same behaviour. This assumption is inconsistent with all current theories of individual behaviour and has, moreover, been falsified in many experiments. It follows that many alleged experimental tests of IO models are irrelevant to mainstream IO. This raises the question of whether relevant laboratory tests are possible at all. The answer is positive if one considers theories of the firm that relate organizational behaviour to the internal structure of the firm, like Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contractual view of the firm.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 05-2012en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordindustrial organizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopoly theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioural economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtheory of the firmen_US
dc.subject.keywordhomo oeconomicusen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrieökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimentelle Ökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.titleIndustrial organization in the laboratoryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn683490931en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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