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Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg >
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56549
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| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Keenan, Donald C. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Naqvi, Nadeem | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pech, Gerald | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-04T13:55:32Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-04T13:55:32Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56549 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of a symmetric, two-country trade model in which countries move in alternating-move, dynamic either tariffsetting or quota-setting games in Markov Perfect strategies, and compares the respective equilibrium level of tariffs and quotas with the corresponding pairs in the equilibria of static games. Our results imply that the alleged non-equivalence of the outcomes of tariff-retaliation (neither free trade nor autarky) and quota-retaliation (asymptotic autarky) games in the literature depends crucially on complete myopia, and can be dismissed altogether once dynamic considerations are introduced in an operationally significant manner. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburg | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Joint discussion paper series in economics 44-2011 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | foreign trade policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tariff | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | quota | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | retaliation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dynamic game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Markov perfect equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | supermodular games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zollpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenhandelskontingent | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dynamisches Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Markovscher Prozess | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A theory of dynamic tariff and quota retaliation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 671915606 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg
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