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Title:Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal? PDF Logo
Authors:Dadasov, Ramin
Harms, Philipp
Lorz, Oliver
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Joint discussion paper series in economics 14-2010
Abstract:This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.
Subjects:institutions
capital mobility
political economy
JEL:F21
O16
P48
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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