|
EconStor >
Philipps-Universität Marburg >
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg >
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56529
|
| | |
| Title: | | Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?  |
| Authors: | | Dadasov, Ramin Harms, Philipp Lorz, Oliver |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Joint discussion paper series in economics 14-2010 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class. |
| Subjects: | | institutions capital mobility political economy |
| JEL: | | F21 O16 P48 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56529
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|