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dc.contributor.authorCarbonara, Emanuelaen_US
dc.contributor.authorParisi, Francescoen_US
dc.contributor.authorvon Wangenheim, Georgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:54:47Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:54:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56522-
dc.description.abstractAccording to expressive law theories, expression of values is an important function played by the law. Expressive laws affect behavior, not by threatening sanctions or promising rewards, but by changing individual preferences and tastes and, in some cases, by affecting social norms and values. New laws, however, can run against sticky social norms, failing to achieve their expressive effects. By developing a dynamic model, in this paper we show that inexpressive laws (laws whose expressive function is undermined by sticky norms) can not only be ineffective but can push the values of society away from those expressed by the law. We study the effects of legal intervention on the values shared by members of society, considering the feedback effects between laws and social norms. Just like expressive laws can foster consensus in heterogeneous groups, inexpressive laws can create a social divide, even in previously homogeneous societies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 10-2010en_US
dc.subject.jelK10en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelB52en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcountervailing effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordexpressive lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordcivil disobedienceen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.subject.stwRechten_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInexpressive lawen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn623218925en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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