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dc.contributor.authorPakula, Benjaminen_US
dc.contributor.authorGötz, Georgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:49:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:49:57Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56510-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the incentives to upgrade input quality in vertically related (network) industries. Upstream investments have a biased effect on the downstream companies and lead to vertical product differentiation. Different vertical structures such as vertical integration, ownership and legal unbundling lead to different investments. We find that, without regulation, vertical integration and legal unbundling regimes provide highest investment incentives and lead to highest welfare. However, we also find foreclosure in the downstream market if the potential degree of horizontal product differentiation of the entrant is low. Under ownership unbundling, investment incentives are lower but there is never foreclosure of the entrant since this would worsen double marginalisation. When the network operator is subject to a break-even regulation, the investment incentives are crowded out under legal and ownership unbundling whereas they remain nearly unchanged under vertical integration. Welfare and consumer surplus decrease under legal unbundling, but increase under the two other regimes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 09-2011en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvertical integrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.stwNetzzugangen_US
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwSchienenverkehren_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.titleBiased quality investments and organisational structures in network industries: An application to the railway industryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn655737367en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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