Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 17-2010
Publisher: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Abstract: 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation.
Subjects: 
inflation forecast
forecast errors
monetary policy
monetary committee
Federal Reserve
JEL: 
E43
E52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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