|
EconStor >
Philipps-Universität Marburg >
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg >
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Tillmann, Peter | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-04-04T13:49:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-04-04T13:49:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburg | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Joint discussion paper series in economics 17-2010 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | inflation forecast | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | forecast errors | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | monetary policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | monetary committee | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Federal Reserve | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Geldpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gruppenentscheidung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Inflation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Prognose | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Manipulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | USA | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Strategic forecasting on the FOMC | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 625900308 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|