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MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500
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| Title: | | Strategic forecasting on the FOMC  |
| Authors: | | Tillmann, Peter |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Joint discussion paper series in economics 17-2010 |
| Abstract: | | The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation. |
| Subjects: | | inflation forecast forecast errors monetary policy monetary committee Federal Reserve |
| JEL: | | E43 E52 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg
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