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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56464
  

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dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Hans Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-02T12:40:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-02T12:40:35Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978‐3‐86304‐046‐8en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56464-
dc.description.abstractEconomic theory suggests that gasoline retail markets are prone to collusive behavior. Oligopoly market structures prevail, market interactions occur frequently, prices are highly transparent, and demand is rather inelastic. A recent sector inquiry in Germany backed suspicions of tacit collusion and suggested to adopt regulatory pricing rules for gas stations similar to those implemented in Austria, parts of Australia, Luxembourg or parts of Canada. In order to increase consumer welfare these rules either restrict the number of price changes per day or they limit the mark‐up for gasoline retail prices. As theoretical predictions about the impact of these measures are mixed and empirical studies rare, we analyze the effects, using an experimental gasoline market in the lab. Our results reveal that two of the suggested rules rather decrease consumer welfare: The Austrian rule which only allows one price increase per day (while price cuts are always possible) and the Luxembourg rule which introduces a maximum markup for retailers. While no rule tends to induce lower retail prices, the Western Australian rule which allows at most one daily price change (no matter whether up or down) does at least not harm consumers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 47en_US
dc.rights.accessrightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL71en_US
dc.subject.jelL81en_US
dc.subject.jelL88en_US
dc.subject.jelK23en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGasoline Pricesen_US
dc.subject.keywordFuel Pricesen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Gasoline Marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordFuel Price Regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRetail Price Regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordGas Stationsen_US
dc.titleThe Effects of Gasoline Price Regulations: Experimental Evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:47-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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