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dc.contributor.authorGrönqvist, Eriken_US
dc.contributor.authorLundin, Douglasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56372-
dc.description.abstractWho gains from more information on the quality of pharmaceutical drugs? Are there incentives for voluntary post-approval clinical trials among pharmaceutical companies? Contrary to popular belief, this paper shows that it is not in the consumer interest that clinical evidence establishing the relative effectiveness within a class of drugs are produced. Pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, do benefit: the elimination of uncertainty regarding quality increases expected product differentiation, thereby raising prices for both high-quality and low-quality drugs, to the disadvantage of consumers. Still there is no unique equilibrium where the market provides clinical trials. If the costs of carrying out clinical trials are small, in relative terms, there will be a coordination problem between firms, as firms will want a rival firm to carry the cost. If the costs are large they will be prohibitive. Legislation that obligates entering firms to carry out post-approval trials is beneficial for firms if it solves the coordination problem, but is otherwise harmful. Legislation is never in the interest of consumers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEkonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 636en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelI18en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordQuality uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordSymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPharmaceutical marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordClinical trialsen_US
dc.subject.stwPharmazeutisches Produkten_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwPreisniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPharmazeutische Forschungen_US
dc.titleIncentives for clinical trialsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn518070476en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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