Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56357
Authors: 
Roine, Jesper
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 528
Abstract: 
This paper studies studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other's choises, altering one's platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggest that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.
Subjects: 
Voting
Downsian competition
Local equilibrium
Spatial trembles
JEL: 
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
206.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.