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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56331
  
Title:Scapegoats and transparency in organizations PDF Logo
Authors:Segendorff, Björn
Issue Date:2000
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 407
Abstract:A separating equilibrium in which competent (incompetent) leaders choose competent (incompetent) co-workers is investigated. An outside observer rewards the leader at good policy outcomes. The incompetent co-worker can, at bad outcomes, be used as scapegoat. By assumption, the leader may fail in blaming the scapegoat. Two different assumptions on the outside observer's information set are compared. If she cannot observe a failed attempt, the separating equilibrium exists only if two non-mimicking constraints are met. If she can observe a failed attempt, an additional constraint is added due to the possibility of partial mimicking.
Subjects:Separating equilibrium
competence
transparency
co-worker
blame
JEL:C72
D72
D82
J33
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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