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Title:Voting over tax schedules in the presence of tax avoidance PDF Logo
Authors:Roine, Jesper
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 529
Abstract:This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.
Subjects:Tax avoidance
Majority voting
Order-restricted preferences
Single-crossing condition
JEL:C62
D70
H20
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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