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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56304
  
Title:(M)oral hazard? PDF Logo
Authors:Grönqvist, Erik
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 642
Abstract:Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations.
Subjects:Asymmetric information
Moral Hazard
Health Insurance
Porpensity Score Matching
IV
JEL:D82
G22
I11
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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