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SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56304
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| Title: | | (M)oral hazard?  |
| Authors: | | Grönqvist, Erik |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 642 |
| Abstract: | | Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations. |
| Subjects: | | Asymmetric information Moral Hazard Health Insurance Porpensity Score Matching IV |
| JEL: | | D82 G22 I11 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
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