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SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Argenton, Cédric | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-03-28T13:09:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-03-28T13:09:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | It is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a more efficient rival, contrary to what happens in the homogenous product case. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. As a result, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity clause expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign on the contract. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Ekonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholm | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 640 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | vertical differentiation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | exclusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | monopolization | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Produktdifferenzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Markteintritt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preiswettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Duopol | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Vertikale Konzentration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Exclusive quality | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 51956510X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics
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