Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303 
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dc.contributor.authorArgenton, Cédricen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:09:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:09:43Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303-
dc.description.abstractIt is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a more efficient rival, contrary to what happens in the homogenous product case. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. As a result, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity clause expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign on the contract.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x640en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvertical differentiationen
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen
dc.subject.keywordexclusionen
dc.subject.keywordmonopolizationen
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExclusive quality-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn51956510Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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