Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303
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dc.contributor.authorArgenton, Cédricen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:09:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:09:43Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56303-
dc.description.abstractIt is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a more efficient rival, contrary to what happens in the homogenous product case. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. As a result, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity clause expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign on the contract.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x640en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelL42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvertical differentiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexclusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonopolizationen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleExclusive qualityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn51956510Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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