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dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorKets, Willemienen_US
dc.contributor.authorNorde, Henken_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:07:54Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:07:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56259-
dc.description.abstractNorde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEkonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMinimal curb setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordConsistencyen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwAxiomatisierungen_US
dc.titleAn axiomatization of minimal curb setsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn481104410en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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