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dc.contributor.authorBottero, Margheritaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:06:56Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:06:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56237-
dc.description.abstractIn the present work, I adopt the cognitive hierarchy approach to analyze the centipede game. To this end, I present and study an extensive-form version of Camerer et al.'s (2004) original normal-form model. The resulting predictions are evaluated empirically using laboratory data borrowed from a previously published experiment. The paper features two main contributions. First, it presents a parsimonious model that can, in principle, be generalized to any two-person extensive-form game of perfect information. Secondly, it demonstrates that in the centipede game the cognitive hierarchy approach leads to predictions which are not fully backwardly inductive and that can help to explain some key feature of the experimental data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEkonomiska Forskningsinst. Stockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 723en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcentipede gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordcognitive hierarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordparadox backward inductionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental data analysisen_US
dc.subject.stwNormalformspielen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleCognitive hierarchies and the centipede gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617795290en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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