Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56220
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dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:06:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:06:32Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56220-
dc.description.abstractA product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x485en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnoncooperative gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordinertiaen_US
dc.subject.keywordstatus quo biasen_US
dc.subject.keywordadaptive playen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural rationalityen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAdaptive Erwartungen_US
dc.titlePreparation and toolkit learningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn341474827en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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