Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56208
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dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeibull, Jörgenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:06:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:06:14Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56208-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm on the optimal bonus rate is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of temporary changes in the bonus rate as a means to move a firm from a bad to a good equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x466en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen_US
dc.titleSocial norms and optimal incentives in firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn68759765Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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