Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56205
Authors: 
Lippert, Steffen
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570
Abstract: 
We model networks of relational (or implicit)contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access to other network members' sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for network stability and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable subnetworks inhibit more valuable larger networks.
Subjects: 
Networks
Relational Contracts
Peering
Indirect Multimarket Contact
Information transmission
Social Capital
JEL: 
D23
D43
L13
L29
O17
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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