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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:05:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:05:44Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56189-
dc.description.abstractIn line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x707en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen
dc.subject.keywordpre-play communicationen
dc.subject.keywordlegal enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen
dc.subject.keywordguilten
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen
dc.titleContracts and promises: An approach to pre-play agreements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn588120464en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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