Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56189
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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:05:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:05:44Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56189-
dc.description.abstractIn line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x707en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpartnershipsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpre-play communicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegal enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordguilten_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafeen_US
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.titleContracts and promises: An approach to pre-play agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn588120464en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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